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BATSON REVISITED IN AMERICA’S “NEW ERA” OF 
MULTIRACIAL PERSONS 
John Terrence A. Rosenthal ∗ 
Since two bloods course within your veins, 
Both Jam’s and Japhet’s intermingling; 
One race forever doomed to serve, 
The other bearing freedom’s likeness.1 
 
It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the 
indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the 
exercise of their inherent natural rights.  For happily the 
government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no 
sanction — to persecution no assistance, requires only that they 
who live under its protection should demean themselves as good 
citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support.2 
 
 ∗ B.A. 1987, University of California Berkeley; J.D. 1999, Notre Dame Law 
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also wish to express my sincere gratitude to the following people for profoundly 
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 1 Poem from Jacob Steendam to his multiracial son, reprinted in A. LEON 
HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 102 (1978) (citation omitted) [hereinafter MATTER 
OF COLOR]. 
 2 Letter from President George Washington to the Hebrew Congregation of 
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I consider [trial by jury] as the only anchor ever yet imagined by 
man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its 
constitution.3 
INTRODUCTION 
From the time of this country’s founding, America has always 
been a multiracial society.4  In the coming decades, America’s racial 
and ethnic diversity will continue to increase.5  The 2000 Census 
 
Newport, Rhode Island (Sept. 9, 1790), reprinted in OUR SACRED HONOR: WORDS OF 
ADVICE FROM THE FOUNDERS IN STORIES, LETTERS, POEMS, AND SPEECHES 331 (William J. 
Bennett ed., 1997) [hereinafter OUR SACRED HONOR].  The irony of this statement, 
given Washington’s status as a slave owner and the nation’s tolerance of race-based 
slavery, is not lost on the author.  The messenger’s faults, however, do not degrade or 
invalidate the wisdom and truth of the ideals contained in the message.  
Washington’s own moral discomfort with his slave-owner status may be seen in the 
contents of his will and the fact that he manumitted all of his slaves upon his death.  
See George Washington, Last Will and Testament (July 9, 1799), reprinted in OUR 
SACRED HONOR, supra, at 359-60. 
 3 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (1789), available at 
http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeff1520.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 
2001).  Jefferson’s message, like that of Washington’s, is still valid despite his status as 
a slaveholder.  His own moral discomfort about the institution of race-based slavery is 
evident in this passage: 
I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice 
cannot sleep forever: that considering numbers, nature and natural 
means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of 
situation, is among possible events: that it may become probable by 
supernatural interference!  The Almighty has no attribute which can 
take side with us in such a contest.  But it is impossible to be temperate 
and to pursue this subject through the various considerations of policy, 
of morals, of history natural and civil.  We must be contented to hope 
they will force their way into every one’s mind.  I think a change is 
perceptible, since the origin of the present revolution.  The spirit of 
the master is abating, that of the slave rising from the dust, his 
condition mollifying, the way I hope preparing, under the auspices of 
heaven, for a total emancipation, and that this is disposed, in the order 
of events, to be the consent of the masters, rather than by their 
extirpation. 
Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVIII (1787), reprinted in 
OUR SACRED HONOR, supra note 2, at 352.  Yet, Jefferson freed very few of his slaves.  
It is also more likely than not that those slaves he did free were his own offspring 
from a relationship with one of his own slaves, Sally Hemings.  See generally ANNETTE 
GORDON-REED, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND SALLY HEMINGS: AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 
(1997); ROGER WILKENS, JEFFERSON’S PILLOW 99-102 (2001); Jefferson-Hemings DNA 
Testing: An On-Line Resource, at http://www.monticello.org/plantation (last visited 
Sept. 8, 2002). 
 4 See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, 
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1997); see also Viet 
D. Dinh, Races, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1290-91 (1998). 
 5 See Dinh, supra note 4, at 1290 (“Our present society is multiracial, and it will 
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evidences the present and coming racial complexity.6  Mandated by 
the Constitution, this decennial census, for the first time allowed 
individuals to chose more than one race in identifying their racial 
heritage.7  The preliminary results of the 2000 Census show that the 
number of individuals claiming multiracial status is not insignificant.8  
As many as 2.4 percent of our nation’s citizens consider themselves 
multiracial;9 and in California, the nation’s most populace state, the 
percentage is 4.7.10 
Given our society’s historical penchant for discrimination 
against minority racial groups, persons of multiracial backgrounds do 
and will continue to face many of the same problems related to racial 
discrimination that other minority racial groups in our country have 
historically faced.11  These problems include, employment 
discrimination, housing discrimination, and discrimination in the 
administration of our criminal justice system.  Due to the difficulty 
often associated with distinguishing which racial groups multiracial 
individuals belong to or derive from, the problems of discrimination 
 
likely be increasingly so in the future.”). 
 6 See http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-1.pdf (last visited Aug. 
23, 2002). 
 7 A New Look at Race in America, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2001, at A10 (“[T]he 2000 
questionnaire was the first that allowed people to choose more than one race.”).  
Whether the 2000 Census would have a “multiracial” category generated an intense 
debate and vociferous resistance by groups, particularly in the black community, 
opposed to such a category.  See Hickman, supra note 4. 
 8 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 REDISTRICTING DATA SUMMARY FILE, Table 
PL1; see also http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/2001/tables/st00_1.pdf  (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2002). 
 9 John Ritter, California Racial Data Shifts, U.S.A. TODAY, Mar. 30, 2001, at 1A.  
This means that California alone has almost 1.6 million inhabitants of multiracial 
descent.  The author uses the terms “multiracial” and “mixed-racial” interchangeably 
throughout this Article so as to imply no preference for either term.  As to other 
terms referring to race, the following expressions of Joel Williamson sum up the 
weaknesses of the use of any such terms: 
I hope the reader will indulge me in the use of the terms ‘white,’ 
‘black,’ ‘mulatto,’ and ‘Negro.’  Admittedly, they are very loose and 
laden with powerful emotional charges.  But most who read this book 
will know their weaknesses and recognize their strengths as necessary 
symbols in talking about these subjects. 
JOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE xii (1984). 
 10 Ritter, supra note 9, at 1A.  The percentage of multiracial persons in the 
country’s urban centers may be even greater because urban centers have a much 
greater percentage of persons from various ethnic groups.  Sarah Cohen & D’Vera 
Cohn, Racial Integration’s Shifting Patterns: Enclaves Persist, but Black-White Divide 
Shrinks, WASH. POST, April 1, 2001, at A1. 
 11 See generally Michael C. Thornton, Is Multiracial Status Unique?  The Personal and 
Social Experience, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 324 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 
1992). 
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will present these people with unique, and often unrecognized and 
unaddressed problems.12  This Article will address one of these 
potential problems, which is associated with the administration of the 
criminal justice system: discrimination based on race in the use of 
peremptory challenges during the selection of jurors. 
This country has an extensive history of racial discrimination in 
the context of the jury selection process.13  Although both the courts 
and legislatures have attempted to deal with the problem of racial 
discrimination in the jury selection process,14 the solutions provided 
do not solve the problem for those persons of multiracial descent 
who may not be readily identified or perceived as racial minorities.  
In particular, it is a challenge for society to prevent the racially 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in the jury selection 
process, if only one side in the litigation recognizes a multiracial 
potential juror as being multiracial and discriminates based on that 
person’s racial makeup.  What if a juror is dismissed from the jury 
pool by one side due to his or her racial heritage, but neither the 
other side nor the judge recognizes the discrimination because the 
racial makeup of the juror is not readily apparent to either? 
The present jury selection process, mandated by Batson v. 
Kentucky15 to address racial discrimination in the use of peremptory 
challenges, depends upon the ability of the judge and the attorneys 
for both sides to perceive the racial makeup of the potential juror.  
Only then will one party be on notice of the possibility of racial 
discrimination and raise the proper challenge.  If this party does not 
recognize the dismissed person as being of multiracial descent, then 
the constitutional violation goes undiscovered and unremedied.  
 
 12 Professor Randall Kennedy touched on one aspect of the unique problems 
multiracial persons pose to the criminal justice system in his discussion about the 
racial composition of juries.  Professor Kennedy stated the following: 
In an increasingly multiracial society, controversies over racial 
classifications will become even more complex, frequent, and vexing.  
What does the judge do about the person who is part Asian and part 
black?  Is such a defendant entitled to a minimum quota of Asian-
Americans or a minimum quota of African-Americans?  Is an Afro-
Asian juror racially similar to a ‘plain’ African-American? 
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 244 (1997); see also Jordan Lite, Please 
Ask Me Who, Not ‘What,’ I Am, NEWSWEEK (July 16, 2001), at 9. 
 13 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 663-66, 684-
790 (6th ed. 2000); JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL 
OF DEMOCRACY 99-112 (1994); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 271-73 (1998). 
 14 ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 117; see also Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 
28 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq. (amended 2001). 
 15 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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Therefore, Batson, as it is presently structured and enforced, may not, 
and most likely will not solve the problem of racial discrimination in 
the use of peremptory challenges to exclude multiracial persons from 
juries. 
In Part I, the Article will review the legal and societal history of 
racial discrimination against multiracial individuals in our country.  
Part II will then examine the historical problem of racial 
discrimination in the context of the jury selection process and 
describe the present judicial remedy used to address this problem.  In 
Part III, the Article will discuss the results of the 2000 Census, the 
implications of this data with regard to the racial make-up of juries, 
and how these data and anecdotal evidence suggest the existence of a 
unique problem of racial discrimination against multiracial 
individuals in the jury selection process.  Finally, Part IV will suggest 
some potential remedies for this “vexing” problem. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MULTIRACIAL 
AMERICANS 
Race is a strange and flexible concept, with an endless capacity to 
confound.16 
In earlier days we believed in magic, possession, and exorcism, in 
good and evil supernatural powers, and until recently we believed 
in witchcraft.  Today many of us believe in ‘race.’  ‘Race’ is the 
witchcraft of our time.  The means by which we exorcise demons.  
It is the contemporary myth.  Man’s most dangerous myth.17 
Since Europeans first settled on this continent, our society has 
comprised several different ethnic and racial groups.18  Both the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution reference individuals 
of different races.19  Given the predilection of human beings, 
 
 16 ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND: SEEING BEYOND RACE IN A RACE-OBSESSED WORLD 1 
(1997).  For an excellent discussion of race and myths surrounding race, see Naomis 
Zack, American Mixed Race: The U.S. 2000 Census and Related Issues, at 
http://interracialvoice.com/zack.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2002). 
 17 COSE, supra note 16, at 11 (quoting ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN’S MOST DANGEROUS 
MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE (6th ed. 1998)).  The idea of dividing human beings into 
different groups based on the concept of race originated in the seventeenth century.  
The concept of categorizing humans by skin color started with Johann Friedrich 
Blumenbach and continued on into this century.  See Race, at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/section/race_RaceClassificationand 
Racism.asp; see also THE IDEA OF RACE (Robert Bernasconi & Tommy L. Lott eds., 
2000). 
 18 See generally SCOTT L. MALCOMSON, ONE DROP OF BLOOD: THE AMERICAN 
MISADVENTURE OF RACE (2000). 
 
19 The Articles of Confederation states the following: 
[A]ll charges of war and all other expenses . . . shall be defrayed out of 
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multiracial persons were the inevitable result of a multiracial society.20  
Thus, multiracial people have always been a part of America’s social 
fabric.21 
Nevertheless, the law and the legal status of multiracial people 
 
the common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several States in 
proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and 
inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to 
servitude, and three-fifths of all other Persons not comprehended in 
the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes . . . . 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. VIII, amended by Act of Congress (April 18, 1783).  
This appears to be the first use of the euphemism “three-fifths” by the central 
government when referring to black slaves.  The official federal government’s first 
use of the three-fifths term to reference black slaves was in the United States 
Constitution, which states the following: 
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States . . . according to their respective numbers, which shall be 
determined by adding to the whole number of free persons . . . and 
excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. 
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.  For a history and 
description of the reasons for the use of this fraction and euphemism, see WILLIAM 
LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING 119-29, 
171-77 (1992). 
 20 See JAMES AXTELL, THE EUROPEAN AND THE INDIAN: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOHISTORY 
OF COLONIAL NORTH AMERICA 152 (1981) (“One form of temptation — perhaps 
among people of different color the most elemental – was sexual.”); see also JAMES H. 
JOHNSTON, RACE RELATIONS IN VIRGINIA & MISCEGENATION IN THE SOUTH: 1776-1860, 
165-66 (1970) (quoting R.W. SHUFELDT, THE NEGRO: A MENACE TO AMERICAN 
CIVILIZATION 60 (1907)) (“The crossing of the two races commenced at the very out-
start of the vile slave trade that brought them thither; indeed, in those days many a 
negress was landed upon our shores already impregnated by someone of the 
demoniac crew that brought her over.”). 
 21 JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 165.  In 1630, a white male was punished severely 
for apparently having some sort of sexual relations with a black woman.  AUGUST 
MEIER & ELLIOT RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO 42 (3d ed. 1976).  Such 
punishment was also accorded those who apparently engaged in sexual relations with 
multiracial persons.  See Hickman, supra note 4, at 1172 (“As early as 1632, a mere 
fourteen years after the first Blacks arrived in Jamestown, Captain Daniel Elfrye was 
reprimanded by his employer for ‘too freely entertaining a mulatto.’”) (quoting 
WINTHROP D. JORDON, WHITE OVER BLACK 166 (1968)); see also 1 HELEN CATTERALL, 
JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 78 (1925).  The same 
sort of treatment for interracial relations was visited upon White and Native 
Americans who had sexual relations.  In 1631, the Massachusetts General Court 
sentenced a young white man to be whipped for soliciting a Native American woman.  
See AXTELL, supra note 20, at 154.  In the Plymouth colony during this period, several 
cases involved interracial sexual encounters between Whites and Native Americans.  
Id.  Discrimination in how these cases were handled is evident by the different 
penalties placed upon the white person and the Native American.  In one such case, 
the white female was whipped and had to wear a scarlet badge.  In another, a Native 
American male was whipped and expelled, but was not put to death, which was the 
normal sentence for rape, because “’he was but an Indian, and therefore in an 
incapacity to know the horiblenes of the wickednes of this abominable act . . . .”  Id. 
at 155 (quoting Plymouth Colony Records 1:132, 6:98 (Shurtleff ed.)). 
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have not always reflected an attitude of tolerance.  The same types of 
discrimination visited upon other racial minority groups were and are 
practiced by our society against those of multiracial descent.22  With 
this history of discrimination against persons of multiracial heritage 
and their ever-increasing numbers in our society, vigilance with 
regard to the criminal justice system and how it treats these persons is 
critical. 
The earliest apparent case of legally sanctioned discrimination 
against a multiracial person is In Re Mulatto.23  Although the case 
comprises a mere sentence: “Mulatto held to be a slave and appeal 
taken,” it is the first indication of the unequal and discriminatory 
fashion with which the United States legal system would treat persons 
of multiracial descent for at least the next 300 years.24  In an effort to 
address the problems created by the intersection of interracial sexual 
encounters and a slave system based increasingly on race, the Virginia 
House of Burgesses enacted a statute in 1662, reversing the English 
common law rule that children follow the status of the father.  In 
direct refutation of the English common law, the statute stated : 
WHEREAS, some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any 
Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave or free, be it 
therefore enacted, that all children borne in this country shall be 
held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother, 
And that if any Christian shall commit fornication with  a negro 
man or woman, he or she soe offending shall pay double the fines 
imposed by the former act.25 
 
 22 “Unfortunately, oppression is sometimes the common denominator in shared 
identity.  Historically, oppressed people share close bonds.  The reality that 
multiracial people of numerous racial combinations have been unable to embrace 
their entire heritage has, indeed, strongly banded them together as a very distinct 
category.”  Susan Graham, Review of Federal Measurements of Race and Ethnicity, in JON 
MICHAEL SPENCER, THE NEW COLORED PEOPLE: THE MULTIRACIAL MOVEMENT IN 
AMERICA 36 (1997).  Contrary to critics who argue that a multiracial person is 
discriminated against due to being associated with the perceived “subordinate” or 
minority race, “what seems to bind multiracial people is not race or culture, but 
living with an ambiguous status . . . .”  Michael C. Thorton, Is Multiracial Status 
Unique?  The Personal and the Social Experience, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA, 
supra note 11, at 324; see also Oates v. Runyon, 1997 EEOPUB LEXIS 785 (Mar. 13, 
1997) (describing the plaintiff’s race as mixed and the hue of her skin as “light 
brown”); Hill v. Runyon, 1996 EEOPUB LEXIS 3187 (May 28, 1996) (alleging racial 
discrimination due to multiracial descent). 
 23 See CATTERALL, supra note 21. 
 24 Id. 
 25 The Slave Code of Virginia, Act XII (1662) (emphasis in original), reprinted in 
THE POISONED TONGUE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN RACISM AND PREJUDICE 
26 (Stanley Feldstein ed., 1972) [hereinafter POISONED TONGUE]. It is a supreme 
irony that this sort of classification system is still used in twenty-first century America 
to classify biracial or multiracial children.  “‘In cases like these [of biracial children], 
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This new statute changed the law regarding multiracial children to 
mirror that reserved for animals under English law.26  This change 
was significant for several reasons.  First, it allowed fathers to disavow 
their common law and financial responsibilities toward their 
multiracial children.27  Second, multiracial children so conceived 
increased the capital stock of the slave holders if their mothers were 
slaves.28  Thus, the law actually created a perverse incentive that 
encouraged interracial sexual encounters between white men and 
black slave women, and the rape of black slave women by white slave 
owners.29 
Three decades later, in 1691, Virginia enacted a new law aimed 
at stopping the births of that “abominable mixture and spurious 
issue,” a degrading reference to mulattoes or children of mixed 
descent.30  This multiracial statute provided for the banishment of 
 
we always know who the mother is and not always the father.’”  COSE, supra note 16, 
at 6 (quoting an unnamed census official). By way of contrast, it should also be noted 
that under the rules of orthodox Judaism, a person is defined as Jewish through his 
mother for the very reason stated by this census official.  Of course this method of 
delineation was created in the absence of sophisticated DNA testing for paternity. 
 26 A. LEON HIGGENBOTHEM, JR., SHADES OF FREEDOM 34 (1996) [hereinafter 
SHADES OF FREEDOM]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK? ONE NATION’S DEFINITION 48 (1991).  There are, 
however, anecdotal accounts of slave masters and their mistresses living in what some 
have deemed loving or caring relationships.  See EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, 
ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 418 (1974); HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., COLORED 
PEOPLE: A MEMOIR 71 (1995); GORDON-REED, supra note 3.  For an excellent historical 
account of one family’s interracial relationships in the south as a result of the 
institution of slavery, see EDWARD BALL, SLAVES IN THE FAMILY (1998). 
Not long after the statute described above was enacted, Virginia enacted a law 
that let Whites sooth their Christian conscience while simultaneously retaining their 
human property.  SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 47-48  In 1667, the 
legislature pronounced that the act of baptism did not alter the condition of the 
person, either slave or indentured.  Id. at 47.  Prior to this law, baptism generally 
seemed to preclude a Christian person, regardless of race, from being owned.  See 
MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 1, at 36-37. 
 30 Many titles have been created to apply to the various degrees of ethnic mixture 
in a given person.  Mulatto is derived from the Spanish language and means hybrid. 
DAVIS, supra note 29, at 5.  Someone of seven-eighths African descent was deemed a 
“mango” or “sacatra.”  Id. at 36.  A person of three-fourths African descent was 
considered a “sambo” or “griffe.”  Id.  The terms “quadroon” and “octoroon” 
generally referred to a person of one-fourth and one-eighth African descent, 
respectively.  Id. at 36-37.  “Mustee,” derived from the Spanish term mestizo (of 
mixed European and Indian extraction), was used when referring to an octoroon but 
also was applied to one of Indian and African descent. Id.  In America, most of these 
terms did not catch-on, leading to confusion and imprecision in categorizing 
individuals by racial makeup.  For a comical and satirical look at some definitions of 
mulatto, see Danzy Senna, The Mullato Millennium, in HALF AND HALF: WRITERS ON 
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Whites who intermarried with Blacks or mulattoes.31  The same law 
also imposed a fine of fifteen pounds on any free English woman who 
had a “bastard child by a Negro,” and forced the multiracial child 
into slavery until the age of thirty, regardless of the status of the white 
mother.  In the case of an English woman who was an indentured 
servant, her child still suffered the same fate.32 
A number of states, including Pennsylvania, enacted similar 
laws.33  Maryland passed a statute that was even more draconian, 
enslaving white women who married Blacks, as well as their 
multiracial children.34 
In 1705, Virginia amended the 1691 Act, but retained the 
language describing why such an Act was necessary: 
And for a further prevention of that abominable mixture and 
spurious issue, which hereafter may increase in this her majesty’s 
colony and dominion, as well as by English, and other white men 
and women intermarrying with negroes or mulattoes, as by their 
unlawful coition with them, Be it enacted, That whatsoever 
English, or other white man or woman, being free, shall 
intermarry with a negroe or mulatto man or woman, bond or 
free, shall, by judgment of the county court, be committed to 
prison, and there remain, during the space of six months, without 
bail or mainprize; and shall forfeit and pay ten pounds current 
money of Virginia, to the use of the parish as aforesaid.35 
The modification of the 1691 Act did, however, accomplish several 
things.  First, it eliminated any ambiguities regarding the status of 
multiracial children by ensuring that all mixed race children would 
be held in bondage until the age of thirty-one.36  The law further 
clarified the term “mulatto” under the statute by defining one as the 
child of an Indian, or child, grandchild, or great-grandchild of any 
African descent.37  Additionally, it precluded mulattoes, Blacks, 
Indians, and criminals from holding any ecclesiastical, civil, or 
 
GROWING UP BIRACIAL AND BICULTURAL (Claudine C. O’Hearn ed., 1998) [hereinafter 
HALF AND HALF]. 
 31 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 42. 
 32 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 30. 
 33 NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED RACE 79 (1993). 
 34 WILLIAMSON, supra note 9, at 10-11; JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 167. 
 35 An Act Concerning Servants and Slaves (1705), reprinted in POISONED TONGUE, 
supra note 25, at 28. 
 36 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 35. 
 37 Id. The reason for the apparent acceptability of people of mixed Indian 
ancestry may relate to the protection of the descendants of John Rolfe and 
Pocahontas.  Id. at 225. 
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military office, or any other position of public confidence or power.38 
The Virginia legislature again amended the law regarding the 
status of multiracial persons in 1723.  The new law stated that 
children born to a female mulatto or to an Indian indentured 
servant, who were themselves serving until the age of thirty-one, were 
also required to serve the mother’s master for thirty-one years.39  The 
1723 law also deprived mulattoes of the right to vote and limited their 
possession of firearms.40  Free mulatto women were subject to 
taxation.41 
In 1785, the Virginia legislature once again revised its multiracial 
legislation, this time significantly narrowing the applicable 
population.  It changed the definition of mulatto to include only 
those persons with one black grandparent.42  This new definition 
meant that many persons of African descent were now categorized as 
“white,” making this the only historical instance of Virginia law where 
the category of “white” became more inclusive with reference to 
persons of African descent.43  The change also affected those people 
of significant Indian ancestry, since the statute no longer mentioned 
Indians at all.44  The law may have been prompted by the belief that 
had the category been more inclusive, many prominent individuals in 
the community would have been classified as mulatto.45  At least one 
commentator has also hypothesized that in rewriting the law, Whites 
were really attempting to limit any possible alliance between persons 
 
 38 Id. at 38. 
 39 Id. The latter scenario does not appear to be farfetched given that there are 
cases documenting such instances. In Gwinn v. Bugg, 1769 Va. LEXIS 3 (Va. 1769), a 
black male sued for his freedom, claiming among other things that his master did 
not legally own him.  The facts of his claim were as follows: (1) his grandmother, a 
white women, had his mother with a black male; (2) his mother was indentured until 
age thirty-one; (3) before the black male was born his mother’s servitude ended; and 
(4) he was never bound by the churchwardens, yet was sold by his alleged master to 
his owner.  SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 36. 
 40 ZACK, supra note 33, at 80. 
 41 Id. 
 42 JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 192. 
 43 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 39.  In 1910, Virginia adopted a one-
sixteenth rule to define who was black, and later in 1930 finally went to the one-drop 
rule.  DAVIS, supra note 29, at 55. 
 44 The exclusion of persons of mixed Indian descent changed in 1866 when the 
law defined a person of one-quarter Indian descent as a mulatto.  SHADES OF 
FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 40.  Later, an Indian, while on the reservation, was 
defined as any person with at least one-fourth of Indian descent and less than one-
sixteenth of African descent.  However, off the reservation, such a person of African 
descent was defined as Black.  See DAVIS, supra note 29, at 9; ROBERT SICKELS, RACE 
MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 65 (1972). 
 45 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 39. 
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of mixed-descent now considered “white” under the new law, and 
Blacks and mulattoes who had limited, if any, civil rights.46  By 
categorizing these persons of limited African descent as “white” and 
allowing them to receive the benefits of this legal status, multiracial 
persons would have every incentive to support the system of race-
based slavery rather than oppose it.  In this way, Whites may have 
thinned the ranks of potential agitators who might have caused an 
uprising against race-based slavery. 
North Carolina and Tennessee followed Virginia’s example of 
defining race by statute.47  Under North Carolina law, an individual 
with one black great-great-grandparent was defined as a mulatto.48  
While no other states appear to have specifically defined who was to 
be legally considered a mulatto, many states did regulate the activities 
of individuals classified as mulattoes, often subjecting them to the 
same or similar restrictions as Blacks in the community.  In Boston, 
Massachusetts, mulattoes were not allowed to keep hogs or swine 
without a master’s consent.49  Additionally, mulatto servants like 
Blacks, had a 9:00 p.m. curfew.50  In New York City, mulattoes could 
not sell oysters, and in the State of New York, mulattoes could not 
enjoy, hold, or possess certain forms of real property.51  In South 
Carolina, a mulatto could sue for freedom before a common pleas 
court, but only if represented by a guardian.52  In addition, all 
mulattoes within the state were presumed slaves.53  In Georgia, a 
mulatto could not serve as a constable, and could not vote.54  In 1765, 
however, Georgia passed a law to encourage mulattoes to move to the 
state by providing them with the rights of any person born of British 
 
 46 Id.  This change in the law caused some strange and interesting legal 
anomalies to occur.  In the case of Dean v. Commonwealth, a white criminal defendant 
made the argument that two of the witnesses against him were incompetent to testify 
against him because they were mulattoes.  GORDON-REED, supra note 3, at 53-54.  At 
this time, mulattoes could not testify against whites.  Id.  The court deemed this 
argument unpersuasive because it found both witnesses as being white due to the fact 
that each was less than one-fourth black, meaning, under the statute, each witness 
was legally white.  Id.  Strangely, the witnesses’ grandfathers would have been 
considered mulatto, and therefore incompetent to testify against this defendant.  
SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 40. 
 47 JOHNSTON, supra note 20, at 193. 
 48 Id. at 38. 
 49 MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 1, at 80. 
 50 Id. at 77. 
 51 Hickman, supra note 4, at 1181. 
 52 MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 1, at 194. 
 53 Id. at 195. 
 54 Id. at 265. 
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parents, excluding the rights to vote and sit in the Assembly.55  Yet, by 
1769, the State imposed a special fifteen-shilling tax on free 
mulattoes over the age of sixteen.56  By contrast, most mulatto 
children in Louisiana were free and took the status of their father, 
due to that state’s initial use of the Napoleonic Code.57  The State did 
preclude mulattoes from marrying either Whites or Blacks, a fact that 
seemed to imply official recognition of mulattoes as a buffer race.58  
Yet, the laws regarding the status of children changed in 1832 as 
Louisiana courts, following the example of neighboring states, began 
to identify a child with the status of the mother.59 
Throughout the years, other states also enacted laws specifying 
how persons of multiracial descent were to be treated under the law.60  
Although mulattoes in many regions were more often than not 
relegated to the status of Blacks, many people of multiracial descent 
achieved a level of local prominence and prosperity prior to 1850, 
particularly in the Deep South.  In states such as South Carolina, 
Louisiana, and possibly Alabama,61 mulattoes seemed to have acted 
almost as a buffer race, falling somewhere between white and black in 
the legal and social spectrum.62  Around 1850, the environment for 
mulattoes in these areas changed drastically for the worse, due in 
most part to the confluence of three social phenomena: (1) the 
ascent of cotton in the southern economy, (2) the fear of the 
abolition movement in the north, and (3) the Civil War, 
Reconstruction, and their aftermath.63  The change in attitude toward 
mulattoes in these southern areas was reflected by attacks like the one 
made by Henry Hughes of Mississippi: “Hybridism is heinous.  
Impurity of races is against the law of nature.  Mulattoes are 
monsters.  The law of nature is the law of God.  The same law which 
forbids consanguineous amalgamation forbids ethnical 
amalgamation.  Both are incestuous.  Amalgamation is incest.”64 
 
 55 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 39-40. 
 56 MATTER OF COLOR, supra note 1, at 264. 
 57 ZACK, supra note 33, at 81. 
 58 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 36. 
 59 ZACK, supra note 33, at 81. 
 60 See EDWARD REUTER, THE MULATTO IN THE UNITED STATES 111 (1918). 
 61 Hickman, supra note 4, at 1182; see also DAVIS, supra note 29, at 35. 
 62 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 35; see also ZACK, supra note 33, at 81. 
 63 ZACK, supra note 33, at 81; see also DAVIS, supra note 29, at 41. 
 64 HENRY HUGHES, TREATISE ON SOCIOLOGY 31 (1860), reprinted in EUGENE D. 
GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDON, ROLL 419 (1974). The use of the term “amalgamation” in 
reference to multiracial persons is a curiously American institution.  The term comes 
from metallurgy and means the mixture of any metal with mercury.  ZACK, supra note 
33, at 78. 
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Despite such sentiments, mulattoes in the South attempted to 
defend their special status and even formed a regiment in 1861 to 
protect Louisiana.65  Southern white officers disarmed the regiment.66  
Ironically, in 1862, when this same group attempted to defect and 
join the Union Army they were also poorly treated.67  These events 
caused mulattoes to identify more and more with Blacks and less with 
Whites, regardless of their personal affiliations as Northerners or 
Southerners.68 
By the start of the 1860’s and continuing into the twentieth 
century, many states began to drop the numerical, heritage based 
definition used to define a person of multiracial descent, and began 
to define anyone with black ancestry as colored or black.  The 
landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson,69 involved the prosecution of a 
person of mixed descent for violation of Louisiana’s Separate Car 
Act, which prohibited race mixing in railroad seating.70  Homer Plessy 
had purchased his train ticket for the all-white section and was 
subsequently arrested.  He was only one-eighth black, and although 
he told the conductor that he was a Negro when he entered the train 
car, he argued to the United States Supreme Court that he was white 
for purposes of the statute.71  Before the Court, Plessy argued that his 
status as “white” in the community was a property right, and to deny 
him a seat in the white section was to withhold that property right 
from him.72  In upholding the constitutionality of the separate-but-
equal doctrine, the Court stated that whether Plessy actually violated 
the law depended on how Louisiana defined a person of color.73 
This idea of “hypo-descent,”74 or what is commonly now known 
as the “one-drop rule,” became part of the law in many states.75 
 
 65 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 42. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
Plessy was not really the test case for this law.  In an earlier case, another person of 
mixed-descent, Daniel Desdunes, was arrested for violating the law.  SHADES OF 
FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 111-12.  He pled not guilty and his plea was sustained on 
the ground that the law did not apply to interstate travel.  Id. 
 70 COSE, supra note 16, at 17. 
 71 SHADES OF FREEDOM, supra note 26, at 112. 
 72 COSE, supra note 16, at 17. 
 73 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552 (citations omitted).  Plessy seems to have had the last say 
about his race, because historians note that he later registered to vote in the state as a 
white male.  COSE, supra note 16, at 17. 
 74 “Hypo-descent” means that a person of mixed-descent takes on the status of a 
socially subordinate group.  DAVIS, supra note 29, at 5. 
 75 “It is a fact that, if a person is known to have one percent of African blood in 
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Georgia’s law reflected the notion of race by defining people of color 
as: 
All negroes, mulattoes, mestizos and their descendants, having 
any ascertainable trace of either Negro or African, West Indian, or 
Asiatic Indian blood in their veins, and all descendants of any 
persons having either Negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic 
Indian blood in his or her veins shall be known in this state as 
persons of color.76 
Alabama77 and Arkansas78 employed a general characterization, 
defining Negro as any person of African descent.  The idea behind 
the one-drop rule became uniformly accepted in white communities 
by 1915, and in the black communities by 1925.79 
Other states, however, continued the numerical system of 
defining a person by their heritage,80 even though outward 
appearance seemed to have been the decisive factor in delineating 
one’s race.  Certain states, like South Carolina, opposed the one-drop 
rule and its application in terms of anti-miscegenation laws for fear 
that it would prevent many marriages among white families, since so 
many of these families had black ancestry.81  Legislator G. Tillman of 
South Carolina argued that many of these families had contributed 
men to the Confederate cause and it would be “unjust and 
 
his veins, he ceases to be a white man.  The ninety-nine percent of Caucasian blood 
does not weigh by the side of the one percent African blood.  The white blood 
counts for nothing.  The person is a Negro every time.”  BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, 
THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN NEGRO 158 (1900).  This idea persists almost one 
hundred years later as evidenced by the following quote from the pop musician 
Lenny Kravitz, whose mother was black and father is white: “Accept the blessing of 
having the advantage of two cultures, but understand that you are Black.  In this 
world, if you have one spot of Black blood, you are Black.  So get over it.”  COSE, 
supra note 16, at 18 (quoting from Lynn Norment, Am I Black, White, Or In Between?, 
EBONY, Aug. 1995, at 112).  Not all multiracial people agree with this ideal.  See 
generally COSE, supra note 16, at 4; HALF AND HALF, supra note 30.  The one-drop rule 
is so ingrained in our nation’s conscience that the mother of a biracial child, while 
acknowledging her son’s multiracial heritage, also stated that she was preparing him 
for his struggles as a “black” male in our society.  See Felicia Lee, My Battle for My Son, 
PARENTS, July 2001, at 102. 
 76 See STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR 90 (Pauli Murray ed., 1997) (citing GA. 
CODE ANN. § 79-103 (1935)). 
 77 Id. at 22. 
 78 Id. at 38 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-808 (1911)). 
 79 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 76-77.  Not everyone in the Black community accepted 
those of mixed-descent as being Black.  For example, Marcus Garvey, leader of the 
famous black separatist movement in the 1920s, did not accept mulattoes as being 
sufficiently black, and demanded that mulattoes be segregated from full-blooded 
Blacks.  Id. at 134. 
 80 See generally id. 
 81 Id. 
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disgraceful to discredit them by declaring them of black ancestry.”82  
These arguments proved persuasive in South Carolina, and in 1895 
the state enacted a law that defined a Negro as a person of one-eighth 
African descent.83 
Most, if not all of the statutes defining race were aimed at one 
goal: continued subordination of the black community by 
criminalizing miscegenation.  At one point or another, some thirty-
eight states had such laws.84  These laws were used as a method of 
supporting and bolstering Jim Crow laws that continued to suppress 
the black community.85  Jim Crow laws prohibited mixed marriages, 
so the multiracial children born of these illegal marriages shouldered 
the punishment because they were considered illegitimate.86  Laws 
classifying multiracial persons also applied to persons of other ethnic 
descent.  Between 1870 and 1900, Louisiana reclassified persons of 
mixed Chinese and non-Chinese descent as Chinese, black, and 
white.87  In the Washington and Oregon Territories in the 1870’s, 
children of white males and Native American women were classified 
as “half-breeds.” 
The United States Supreme Court finally deemed anti-
miscegenation laws unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses in the 1967 
case, Loving v. Virginia.88  At the time Loving was decided, sixteen 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 76, at 407 (citing S.C. CONST. art 
III, § 33 (1895)); DAVIS, supra note 29, at 45. 
 84 SICKELS, supra note 44, at 64. 
 85 See Letter from J. Thomas Heflin, Alabama Senator, to Mr. Sam H. Reading 
(Oct. 15, 1929), in POISONED TONGUE, supra note 25, at 206-08. During the 
Reconstruction many states repealed their anti-miscegenation laws, but later 
resurrected them under Jim Crow.  DAVIS, supra note 30, at 43. 
 86 See generally STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR, supra note 76.  There is 
anecdotal evidence that suggests some white parents lied about their race on the 
birth certificates of their multiracial children, claiming to be Black.  This may have 
been done in order to prevent their children from being deemed illegitimate.  See, 
e.g., Telephone interview with Angela Guidetta (May 30, 2001); Birth Certificate of 
Angela Guidetta (on file with author). 
 87 COSE, supra note 16, at 25. 
 88 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).  It is noteworthy that at this time the sentiment 
against interracial marriages still ran high even when such marriages involved 
persons of distinction from both races.  In 1967, the daughter of then Secretary of 
State Dean Rusk was to marry a Black Air Force Captain at the chapel of Stanford 
University.  SICKELS, supra note 44, at 124.  The wedding was held away from 
Washington D.C. in order to avoid potential embarrassment due to boycotts by 
various dignitaries with discriminatory racial opinions.  Id. 
For an account of the history and rationale of antimiscegenation laws, see 
http://www.africanaonline.com/miscegenation.htm.  Although unconstitutional for 
decades, it was not until November 2000 that the last state’s antimiscegenation law 
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states, including Virginia, still had such laws on the books..89 
Despite Loving, states continued to define people by race 
through the law, either by percentage of ancestry or hypo-descent.90  
This practice of race delineation persisted in various states despite 
the fact that states could not constitutionally discriminate based on a 
person’s race.91  In Jane Doe v. State,92 members of a family argued that 
the State should be required to change the status of “colored” given 
to them on their birth certificates to that of “white” because their 
parents were white.93  The family members also challenged the 
constitutionality of a repealed law that designated any individual as 
colored or black if they were more than one-thirty-second of African 
descent..  The case had its origins in the fact that Mrs. Susie Guillory 
Phipps was denied a passport because she marked “white” on the 
application even though her birth certificate stated “colored.”94  She 
argued that she thought of herself as white, had married two white 
men, and had lived in the community as a white woman.95  The trial 
court found that she was at least three-thirty-second black, and 
therefore “colored” for purposes of the statute in force at the time of 
her birth.96 
The Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s 
 
was removed from the books.  See Jeff Amy, Voters strike ban on interracial marriage, 
MOBILE REGISTER, Nov. 8, 2000. 
Employment discrimination against persons based on their marriage to, 
relationship with, or child with a person of another race is actionable under Title 
VII.  See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 588-89 
(5th Cir. 1998) (finding that Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment 
practices premised on an interracial relationship), opinion vacated, 169 F.3d 215 (5th 
Cir.), opinion reinstated except for issue of punitive damages, 182 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); 
Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, 173 F.3d 988, 994 (6th Cir. 1999) (involving a Title 
VII claim by a plaintiff who was fired for fathering biracial a child); Parr v. Woodman 
of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving a Title VII 
claim by a white job applicant against an employer due to her being in an interracial 
marriage); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361-62 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 89 The California Supreme Court was the first high state court to overturn an 
anti-miscegenation law on equal protection grounds.  See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 
(1948). 
 90 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 51-80. 
 91 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (1954). 
 92 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 485 So. 2d 60 (La.), cert. dismissed, 
Doe v. Louisiana Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 479 U.S. 1002 (1986) (dismissing 
for lack of a substantial federal question). 
 93 Id. at 371. 
 94 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 10.  The history of the plaintiff’s racial heritage dates to 
1770, when a French planter, Jean Gregoire Guillory, had a slave mistress, Margarita.  
Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
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determination.  The Court of Appeals ruled that the family members 
had no right to challenge the designation of their parents, and even 
if they did have such a right, they failed to prove that their parents’ 
designation as “colored” was incorrect.97  The Court also held that the 
repealed statute in question was not relevant to the case because the 
designation was made not by a public official, but by a midwife 
without the aid of the statute.98  The Louisiana Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, 99 and the United 
States Supreme Court dismissed the case on appeal.100  Because the 
Supreme Court dismissed the case on appeal, academics have argued 
that the one-drop rule gained official sanction by the judicial 
system.101 
Notwithstanding the fact that laws defining persons of mixed 
descent no longer exist or are not enforceable, their absence has not 
completely erased the discrimination and social stigma visited upon 
multiracial persons.  Persons of mixed-descent, and particularly those 
of mixed black and white descent, have suffered varying degrees of 
discrimination by various racial groups.102  Many critics argue that it is 
not the multiracial aspect of the person that precipitates such 
discrimination, but rather his or her association with the perceived 
subordinate minority group.103  This, however, does not account for 
the early laws specifically aimed at multiracial persons, nor the 
discrimination practiced against such persons by majority and 
minority racial groups.104 
Books such as Life on the Color Line,105 The Color of Water,106 and 
 
 97 Doe, 479 So. 2d at 371-72. 
 98 Id. at 372. 
 99 485 So. 2d 60 (La. 1986). 
 100 Doe v. Louisiana Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 479 U.S. 1002 (1986). 
 101 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 9-11.  The one-drop rule has never really been legally 
authorized or applied in this country to any multiracial people, other than those of 
Native American descent.  Id. at 12.  At least one author has decried the one-drop 
rule as unconstitutional because it inherently treats people of part Black descent 
differently from other mixed-race persons.  See M.R. Franks, Seeing in Black and White, 
144 NEW L.J. 1287, Part II (1994), available at http://www.exstellis.org (last visited 
Oct. 12, 2002). 
 102 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 142-74; SPENCER, supra note 22, at 36; Hickman, supra 
note 4, at 1182 n.88. 
 103 See generally SPENCER, supra note 22; Hickman, supra note 4. 
 104 See Hansborough v. City of Elkhart Parks & Recreation Dep’t, 200 F. Supp. 199, 
201 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (holding intraracial discrimination actionable under Title VII); 
Walker v. Sec’y of the Treasury, 713 F. Supp. 403, 404 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (involving a 
lawsuit against the IRS alleging that the plaintiff’s termination was really because her 
dark-skinned supervisor was hostile towards her due to her light skin tone). 
 105 GREGORY HOWARD WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE TRUE STORY OF A 
WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995) (describing the discrimination the 
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Who is Black,107 are testaments to the fact that multiracial persons are 
the subjects of racial discrimination by both the majority and 
minority communities.108  In addition to its description in books, 
societal discrimination against multiracial persons can be witnessed 
in such racially insensitive statements as those made by golfer Fuzzy 
Zoeller about Tiger Woods,109 and the uproar of the black community 
after Woods declared himself of mixed descent rather than solely 
black.110 
This portion of the article, which predominately focuses on the 
historical legal discrimination against persons of mixed black and 
white descent, should not be construed as “a bichromatic focus on 
race relations”111 involving only Blacks and Whites.  Rather, the legal 
history of discrimination against multiracial persons necessarily lends 
itself to such a focus and, but for the one-drop rule, such 
discrimination would not be construed as having only bichromatic 
hue.112  Instead of simply suggesting a “bichromatic” tilt, the focus of 
this section on the legal history of racial discrimination against 
multiracial persons, regardless of what mixture, supports the 
conclusion that such discrimination existed in our society, and that 
vigilance against discrimination is still necessary today.  Vigilance is 
justified when parties in our justice system attempt to use peremptory 
challenges to discriminate based on race.  Such discrimination 
undercuts the ideal that our justice system is fair to all. 
II.  RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND JURIES 
As in other facets of this country’s social legacy, the criminal 
justice system has not been immune to the insidious effects of racial 
discrimination.  From the time of this country’s founding,113 race has 
played a part, formally or informally, in how the criminal justice 
 
author withstood by both Blacks and Whites do to his mixed heritage). 
 106 JAMES MCBRIDE, THE COLOR OF WATER (1998). 
 107 DAVIS, supra note 29. 
 108 See id.; see also CLARENCE PAGE, SHOWING MY COLOR: IMPOLITE ESSAYS ON RACE 
AND IDENTITY 283-302 (1996); KATHY RUSSELL ET AL., THE COLOR COMPLEX (1992). 
 109 See CNN Interactive, Golfer Says Comments about Woods ‘Misconstrued’ (April 21, 
1997), available at http://www.cnn.com/US/9704/21/fuzzy. 
 110 See PAGE, supra note 108, at 285; Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade 
of Pale, 47 UCLA. L. REV. 1705, 1738 n.149 (2000); see also Janita Poe, Tiger Woods 
Spotlights Multiracial Identity, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 1997, available at 
www.texnews.com/tiger/pride042197.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2002). 
 111 Dinh, supra note 4, at 1289. 
 112 Id. at 1289 n.2. 
 113 See generally DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (3d ed. 1992). 
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system functions and dispenses justice.114  This has been most evident 
in the selection and empanelling of a jury. 
The jury selection process is dictated by statute in every 
jurisdiction in this country.115  Despite differences in some details, a 
general process is followed in each jurisdiction.116  The process begins 
when the proper officials compile a list of eligible jurors.117  Before 
trial, individuals randomly selected from this list are provided with 
notice that they are to appear for possible jury service.118  This group 
of individuals is commonly known as the venire.119  Prior to trial, the 
venirepersons are questioned by the judge, the attorneys for both 
sides, or both in a voir dire.120  Voir dire is essentially the process by 
which judges and/or lawyers question the potential jurors in an 
attempt to select a jury “free of prejudice and capable of rendering a 
free and fair verdict based on the trial proceedings.”121 
During the voir dire, a venireperson may be removed from the 
venire by two methods: (1) for cause, or (2) by peremptory 
challenge.123  A potential juror may be removed “for cause” if he or 
she provides answers and/or acts in a manner that indicates an 
inability to be impartial in the case or is otherwise unfit or unable to 
serve on the jury.  When a juror is removed “for cause,” the attorney 
requesting the removal must provide the judge with a reason 
sufficient to justify removal.  The number of challenges “for cause” 
are generally unlimited.124 
As opposed to challenges “for cause,” peremptory challenges do 
not normally require an attorney to provide a reason for the 
challenge to the judge.  Although all jurisdictions in this country 
 
 114 Id. 
 115 Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Explanations 
Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 MICH. J. L. REFORM 229, 230 (1993). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id.  For a detailed explanation of how racial bias can and has effected the 
system before the venire is formed, see KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 169-92.  For a 
severe critique of Kennedy’s book, see Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of 
Race, Crime, and Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270 (1998), and Kim Taylor-Thompson, The 
Politics of Common Ground, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1306 (1998). 
 120 Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 115, at 230. 
 121 Honorable David Baker, Civil Case Voir Dire and Jury Selection, 1998 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 3 (1998); see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a) (“The court may permit the defendant’s 
attorney and the attorney for the government to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination.”). 
 122 Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a). 
 123 KENNEDY, supra note 12, at 181. 
 124 Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 115, at 230. 
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allow for peremptory challenges,125 the number of peremptory 
challenges each side may utilize is limited by statute, and varies 
depending on whether the case is criminal or civil.126 
There is no constitutional requirement for peremptory 
challenges.127  Originating in Roman law,128 the peremptory challenge 
in the American legal system owes its existence to its following of 
English common-law traditions.129  Soon after the country’s founding, 
Congress mandated the use of peremptory challenges in the federal 
courts,130 and the states followed suit.131  The peremptory challenge is 
now a part of the trial process, both civil and criminal, in every state 
in the nation.132 
A.  The History of Racial Discrimination in the Jury Selection Process133 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution mandates that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law . . . .”134  Despite this mandate 
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 134 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The right to a jury trial in civil suits at common law is 
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of impartiality, the language of the Amendment left much room for 
maneuvering by both courts and legislatures in terms of defining the 
qualifications for jury service in criminal trials, and how juries would 
be empanelled.135  As a result of this leeway, the jury selection process 
has a long history of discrimination against minorities. 
Before the advent of the Civil War, all but one state, 
Massachusetts, essentially disallowed Blacks from serving on juries.136  
Although during the Post-war Reconstruction period some 
jurisdictions within the South allowed black males to serve on juries, 
most states continued to bar racial minorities from jury service.137  
Often, this discriminatory exclusion of minorities from juries “was 
open, formal, and unapologetic.”138  As of 1873, at least one state, 
West Virginia, enacted a statute that limited jury service to white 
males over the age of twenty-one.139 
In what appears to be a response to the exclusion of Blacks from 
juries, Congress enacted a law that criminalized racial discrimination 
in the jury selection process.  The 1875 law provided as follows: 
No citizen possessing all other qualifications which are or may be 
prescribed by law shall be disqualified for service as grand or petit 
juror in any court of the United States, or of any State on account 
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and whoever, 
being an officer or other person charged with any duty in the 
selection or summoning of jurors, excludes or fails to summon 
any citizen for such cause, shall be fined not more than $5,000.140 
“This provision, however, has never been effectively enforced [and] 
[t]he case law offers only one instance of a prosecution under this 
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statute.”141 
1.  Strauder v. West Virginia and Neal v. Delaware: The 
Supreme Court Finally Steps In 
In 1879, the United States Supreme Court stepped into the fray 
and began to issue opinions that resolved many of the legal issues 
regarding Blacks and their ability to serve on juries.142  In Strauder v. 
West Virginia,143 the plaintiff, a black male convicted of murder by an 
all white jury in West Virginia, appealed to the Supreme Court and 
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment provided him with a 
Constitutional right to be tried by a jury “selected and impaneled 
without discrimination against his race or color, because of race or 
color.”144 
The Court agreed that West Virginia’s law violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment observing that: 
[the Fourteenth Amendment] contain[s] a necessary implication 
of positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, 
the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation against them 
distinctly as colored, exemption from the legal discriminations, 
implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their 
enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations 
which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a 
subject race.145 
In examining the statute, the Court noted two distinct harms 
due to the prohibition.  First, the prohibition in essence branded 
Blacks as inferior and increased racial prejudice. 146  Second, it 
deprived the black criminal defendant of the chance to have those of 
his own race judge his action.147 
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 146 Id. at 307-09.  The Court was willing to go only so far at this point in 
interpreting what constituted state action as it related to discrimination in the jury 
selection process.  In Virginia v. Rives, the Court held that simply because no black 
person had served on a grand jury or petit jury, the Fourteenth Amendment is not 
offended; nor is it state action when a private individual, working for the state, 
violates the law by not placing black jurors in the pool or on the venire.  100 U.S. 313 
(1880); see also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); LOIS B. MORELAND, WHITE 
RACISM AND THE LAW 48-58 (1970) (analyzing the Court’s decisions in Strauder, Rives, 
and Ex Parte Virginia). 
 147 Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-09. 
 2002 A “NEW ERA” OF MULTIRACIAL PERSONS 89 
Although the unconstitutionality of the statute in Strauder was 
easily determined because race was plainly stated in the text of the 
law, some states’ statutes were far less obvious.  In Neal v. Delaware,148 
the discrimination based on race was subtle and not discernable 
based solely on the language of the statute.  The defendant in Neal, a 
black male, was charged with rape and convicted by an all-white jury 
in Delaware.149  State officials conceded that no Blacks had ever 
served on a jury in Delaware.150  At issue in Neal was whether Delaware 
officials had purposefully excluded black jurors or whether there was 
another explanation for why an all-white jury tried the defendant.151  
The Delaware Supreme Court held that there was no Fourteenth 
Amendment violation.152  The court noted that the all-white jury was 
not selected because of discrimination, but because of a lack of 
Blacks qualified to sit on juries.153 
The United States Supreme Court disagreed and held that the 
State’s actions did constitute racial discrimination in jury selection.154  
The Court noted that although between 1870 and 1890 Delaware had 
a black population of no less than twenty thousand, no black persons 
had ever been summoned to sit on a jury.155  According to the Court: 
[i]t is . . . under the circumstances, a violent presumption which 
the State Court indulged in, that such uniform exclusion of 
[Blacks] from juries, during a period of many years, was solely 
because, in the judgment of those officers, fairly exercised, the 
black race in Delaware were utterly disqualified, by want of 
intelligence, experience or moral integrity, to sit on juries.156 
Because the State provided no plausible explanation for these 
circumstances, the Court inferred discrimination against Blacks in 
the jury selection process.157 
After the decisions in Strauder and Neal, the Supreme Court 
abandoned the issue of racial discrimination in the context of juries 
until 1935.  In that year, the Court decided Norris v. Alabama,158 a case 
that dealt with the Scottsboro Boys prosecutions.  Norris and other 
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similar cases suggested that the Court was no longer willing to simply 
defer to the factual findings of the state courts.  Some later decisions, 
however, indicated that if state officials did not permit jury pools to 
be completely devoid of minorities, the Court would not find a 
Constitutional violation. 
2.  Swain v. Alabama: The Supreme Court Ineffectively 
Addresses Racial  Discrimination in Peremptory 
Challenges 
The Supreme Court considered the use of peremptory 
challenges when eliminating jurors based solely on race in Swain v. 
Alabama.159  Robert Swain, a black male, was convicted of rape by an 
all white jury and sentenced to death in 1962 in Taladega County, 
Alabama.160  Although Swain’s venire started with eight black jurors, 
two were exempt from service, and the prosecutor used six 
peremptory challenges to strike the rest.161  After the Alabama 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, Swain petitioned for certiori 
to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that the 
prosecutor’s alleged use of peremptory challenges to strike all of the 
black veniremen violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.162 
After citing Strauder and Neal, and various other cases in which 
the Court held that racial discrimination violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court, in Swain, reversed course and stated 
that the Constitution did not require an examination of the 
prosecutor’s motives for exercising his peremptory challenges in a 
certain case.163  The Court reasoned that requiring an analysis of 
prosecutorial intent would “establish a rule wholly at odds with the 
peremptory challenge system as we know it.”164  Further, the court 
stated that “it is permissible to insulate from inquiry the removal of 
Negroes from a particular jury on the assumption that the prosecutor 
is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying . 
. . .”165 
The Court then developed the standard that a defendant must 
meet in order to prove that a prosecutor acted with discriminatory 
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intent when removing jurors. The defendant must show that the 
prosecutor, “case after case, whatever the crime and whoever the 
defendant or victim may be, is responsible for the removal of Negroes 
who have been selected as qualified jurors . . . with the result that no 
Negroes ever serve on petit juries.”166  The Court held that the record 
did not present sufficient evidence to overcome this burden.167 By 
focusing on the long history of the peremptory challenge as a 
litigation tool, the court allowed prosecutors to use race as a criteria 
for the disqualification of jurors.  In doing so the Court ignored the 
longstanding use of the peremptory challenge for racial 
discrimination168 and focused on tradition and administrative ease.  
Swain demonstrates the extent to which the Court will defer to state 
court decisions. 
In the aftermath of Swain, several federal and state courts 
attempted to circumvent the insurmountable requirements of Swain.  
In United States v. Robinson,169 Judge Jon Newman, through the power 
of the federal bench, attempted to force prosecutors to reform their 
use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race.  
Robinson involved the prosecution of co-defendants, one of whom was 
black, for embezzlement and conspiracy.170  Defense counsel objected 
when the prosecutor used all four of his peremptory challenges to 
excuse all four of the black jurors from the venire.171  When Judge 
Newman offered the prosecutor a chance to provide a race neutral 
reason for the strikes, the prosecutor declined.172 
Judge Newman then allowed defense counsel the opportunity to 
analyze the records relating to the venire in Connecticut federal cases 
during the previous two-year period.173  Defense counsel found that 
although eighty-two Blacks sat as veniremen, the prosecutor used 
fifty-seven peremptory challenges to strike black jurors.174  In cases 
involving black or Hispanic defendants, the exclusion rate jumped to 
almost eighty-five percent compared to the overall average of almost 
seventy percent.175  Given the statistical findings, Judge Newman 
stated “the pattern of government peremptory challenges of Black 
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veniremen has now reached an excessive point that calls for the 
exercise of this Court’s supervisory power over the conduct of 
criminal trials in this District.”176  The Judge then ordered that the 
four black veniremen be reinstated to the panel.177  He further 
ordered that the United States Attorney’s office keep a record of each 
criminal trial, including the number of black veniremen included on 
the final panel and the number of peremptory challenges used by the 
prosecutor against Blacks with no explanation.178 
Judge Newman’s apparent victory for justice and racial equality 
was short-lived.  In United States v. Newman,179 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed Robinson.  The Second Circuit held that the 
defendants’ did not have any actionable due process claims under 
Swain, and that Judge Newman had no authority to modify the jury 
selection process.180  The Second Circuit vacated Judge Newman’s 
orders and remanded the case.181 
Next, state courts began to address the issue of racial 
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, in light of Swain. 
In People v. Wheeler,182 the California Supreme Court decided that the 
“use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the 
sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury . . . under 
article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.”183  In criticizing 
the reasoning in Swain, the California Supreme Court stated that “[i]t 
demeans the Constitution to declare a fundamental personal right 
under that charter and at the same time make it virtually impossible 
for an aggrieved citizen to exercise that right.”184  The Wheeler court 
held that Swain was inapplicable on state law grounds because the 
California Constitution covered the issue of racial discrimination in 
the use of peremptory challenges.185 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
also declined to follow Swain in Commonwealth v. Soares,186 where the 
defendants were convicted of first-degree murder.  The court held 
that article 12 of the Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights proscribed 
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the use of peremptory challenges to “exclude prospective jurors 
solely by virtue of their membership in, or affiliation with, particular, 
defined groupings in the community.”187  The Court reasoned that 
diversity is part and parcel of a panel’s impartiality, and that 
“[n]owhere is the dynamic commingling of the ideas and biases of 
such [diverse] individuals more essential than inside the jury 
room.”188 
Despite the antipathy of some state courts to the holding in 
Swain, most state courts did not follow Wheeler and Soares in their 
condemnation of Swain and its requirements.  In State v. Wiley,189 
Fields v. People,190 State v. Stewart,191 Commonwealth v. Henderson,192 and 
Nevius v. State,193 various state courts either questioned or criticized 
Wheeler and took the more conservative approach to the problem as 
enunciated in Swain. 
3.  Batson v. Kentucky: The Supreme Court Tries Again 
Twenty years after Swain, the Court revisited the issue of the 
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky. 194  
Although the Court ostensibly accepted the case to resolve a Sixth 
Amendment issue of jury impartiality, the Court decided the case on 
an issue not briefed by either side: the application of the Equal 
Protection Clause.195  The underlying facts of Batson mirror those of 
its predecessors.  The defendant in Batson was a black male convicted 
by an all-white jury of burglary and receipt of stolen goods.196  The 
prosecutor used four of his six peremptory challenges to remove all 
four of the prospective black jurors.197  On appeal, the Kentucky 
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Supreme Court declined to follow Wheeler and affirmed the 
conviction.198 
Although suggesting that it was merely affirming Swain, the 
United States Supreme Court changed the process by which a 
criminal defendant went about proving racial discrimination in the 
jury selection process.199  Under the Court’s holding the defendant 
would no longer have to prove a long history of racial discrimination 
by the prosecutor.  Instead, the Batson court set up a three-tiered test 
for determining racial discrimination in the use of peremptory 
challenges.  First, a defendant has to make out a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination in the prosecutor’s use of his peremptory 
challenges.200  To do so, the defendant must show that he is a 
member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor had 
used peremptory challenges to rid the venire of persons of that racial 
group.201  Second, the defendant has to point to facts and 
circumstances, which raise the inference that the prosecutor used his 
peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory fashion.202  If a trial 
judge is satisfied that the defendant has made a prima facie case, then 
the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason 
for his use of peremptory challenges.203  The third step requires the 
trial judge to determine whether, based on all the facts and 
circumstances, the defendant has shown that the prosecutor used the 
peremptory challenges to exclude veniremen based on their race.204 
4.  Batson: Mutations and Legacy 
The decision in Batson in no way ended the controversy 
surrounding racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in the jury 
selection process. The issue of whether the Sixth Amendment’s 
“impartial jury” language could be used to challenge the exclusion of 
a juror because of race remained undecided.  It was also unclear 
whether the injury to the defendant or the injury to the potential 
juror should predominate when a party allegedly discriminates based 
on race through the use of peremptory challenges. 
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The Court’s decision in Holland v. Illinois205 seemed to end the 
debate on whether a defendant can object to an apparently racially 
motivated peremptory challenge on Sixth Amendment grounds.  In 
Holland, a white criminal defendant contested the prosecutor’s use of 
two peremptory challenges to exclude the only black jurors from the 
venire under the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section venire 
requirement.206 In a stiff rebuke the Court stated that the fair-cross-
section requirement does not extend past the venire to the actual 
petit jury and that the Sixth Amendment guarantees nothing more 
than an impartial jury, not a racially representative one.207 
Whether the race of the Batson challenger and that of the 
dismissed juror needed to coincide also remained an open issue.  In 
Powers v. Ohio,208 the Court rid the Batson framework of the 
requirement that the defendant and the venireperson be of the same 
cognizable racial group.209  The defendant in Powers, a white male, 
objected to the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to 
remove six black venirepersons from the panel.210  The Court 
indicated that regardless of the defendant’s race, he has standing to 
challenge a juror’s removal due to race.211  The Court explained that 
interests of the criminal defendant and those of the excluded juror in 
eliminating racial discrimination in the jury selection process 
coincided.212  The Court further emphasized that if a court allowed a 
juror to be dismissed due to race it would impeach the democratic 
process and cast communal doubt on any verdict.213  The nature of 
the decision seemed to shift the emphasis and focus away from the 
equal protection rights of the criminal defendant and on to the equal 
protection rights of potential jurors.214 
As in Holland and Powers, the Court’s decision in Georgia v. 
McCollum215 again extended the Batson prohibition to the use of 
racially motivated peremptory challenges; this time to those used by 
the criminal defendant.  Under McCollum, the Court focused less on 
who raised the challenge, and more on the potential juror’s equal 
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protection rights as a trump to all other considerations.216 
Further expanding the reach of Batson, the Court in Edmonson v. 
Leesville217 held that racial discrimination in the use of peremptory 
challenges in civil cases violated the Equal Protection Clause.218  As in 
Powers and McCollum, the ruling in Edmonson solidified the principle 
that it is the potential juror’s equal protection rights that are at issue 
in a Batson challenge, not those of the criminal defendant. 
The application of Batson and its progeny have proven less 
robust than initially anticipated.219  The concerns laid out in Justice 
Marshall’s prescient concurrence have in fact come to fruition.220  
The ease with which a prosecutor can devise a race-neutral reason for 
a peremptory challenge is clear.  A prosecutor can claim to use their 
challenge because of age, occupation, unemployment, religion, 
demeanor, relationship with a trial participant, lack of intelligence, 
socioeconomic status, residence, marital status, previous involvement 
with the criminal justice system, or jury experience.221  In the most 
recent study of the efficacy of Batson challenges, four out of five 
Batson respondents provided race-neutral reasons acceptable to the 
court.222  Given the Court’s ruling in Purkett v. Elem,223 that a reason 
need not make sense to withstand step two of Batson, trial courts will 
be forced to delve deeper into the facts- something most appear 
hesitant, if not loath to do.224  Batson’s application has also proven 
problematic because in different jurisdictions it is often drastically 
inconsistent.225 
With Batson’s inherent structural flaws and the disparity in which 
it is applied in various jurisdictions, the peremptory challenge in the 
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jury selection process will continue to be abused.  The use of 
peremptory challenges against persons of mixed descent whose 
heritage may not be readily identifiable to one of the parties is an 
example of just such a situation.  The present trend in demographics 
indicates that the number of multiracial persons is increasing.226  
Given this increase and the particular challenge of multiracial 
persons in the jury selection process, Batson may prove untenable in 
our evolving society unless it is modified. 
III.  MULTIRACIAL PERSONS, THE 2000 CENSUS, RACIAL IDENTITY, AND 
BATSON 
The 2000 Census is the first time the United States has 
attempted to quantify how many citizens are multiracial.227  The 2000 
Census has only served to confirm the fact that the number of 
multiracial persons in our society is growing.228  This trend is 
supported by civil rights decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1950’s 
and 1960’s.  Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving, “fewer 
than half of one percent of married couples were interracial.”229  In 
Loving, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for states to 
prevent interracial marriages.230  After the decision in Loving, the 
number of interracial couples grew and by 1990 this number had 
risen to three percent.  The growth in the number of such marriages 
does not appear to be abating.231  This growth in interracial marriages 
has contributed to a concomitant increase in the number is 
multiracial children/persons.232  By 1990, almost two million children 
lived in multiracial families, and these children comprised four 
percent of all children living in households.233 
The 2000 Census enabled citizens to designate their own ethnic 
status.  The results indicated that 2.4 percent of the nations populace 
self-identified as multiracial.  This figure is misleading, though, 
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Negotiating Ethnic Identity: Issues for Black-White Biracial Adolescents, in RACIALLY MIXED 
PEOPLE IN AMERICA 223 (Maria P.P. Root ed., 1992). 
 230 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 231 Id.; see also SPENCER, supra note 22, at 5; Steve Olson, The Genetic Archaeology of 
Race, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, April 2001, at 69, 80. 
 232 Gibbs & Hines, supra note 229, at 223. 
 233 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR CENSUS 2000 DATA ON RACE 
4-5, at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/raceqandas.html (last 
visited June 27, 2001). 
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because of a disparity between the number of people who identify as 
multiracial and those who actually are multiracial.  Despite the 2000 
Census figures, studies indicate that as many as seventy-five percent of 
the black community has some white or European ancestry.234  
Similarly, in the white population, estimates indicate that one to five 
percent have some African ancestry.235  Additionally, persons who are 
of mixed descent but with some Native American ancestry are 
underrepresented because many tribal leaders “encouraged their 
members to check only American Indian on the census form so they 
wouldn’t dilute numbers that can be used for appropriating federal 
funds.”236  This suggests a dramatic undercount of the total number 
of multiracial citizens in the United States. 
In addition to the undercount of multiracial persons based on 
self-selection, which skews the actual number of multiracial persons, 
the percentage of persons under eighteen who consider themselves 
multiracial is four percent, while the percentage of persons eighteen 
and older is two percent.  The percentage of African-Americans 
eighteen years and younger who consider themselves to be of more 
than one race is eight percent.237  These figures are a better 
indication of where the country is headed in terms of the scope of 
our society’s multiracial makeup, because they show that persons in 
the next generation are more likely to identify themselves as 
multiracial.  This willingness to self identify as multiracial will result 
in a more accurate count of multiracial individuals in the future. 
An individual’s preference for how he views himself may not, 
however, accurately indicate how others perceive and treat him.  
Whether a person considers himself “mixed,” biracial, or multiracial, 
the potential ambiguity in that person’s outward appearance can 
create a situation in which others are not sure of or even fail to 
recognize his entire racial makeup.238 
 
 234 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 21; SHIRLEE TAYLOR HAIZLIP, THE SWEETER THE JUICE: A 
FAMILY MEMOIR IN BLACK AND WHITE 15 (1994); F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 180 (1996) (estimating that black Americans may get 
as much as 25% of their genes from “white” sources). 
 235 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 21; see also HAIZLIP, supra note 234, at 15; Madison J. 
Grey, A Founding Father and His Family Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2001, at B1 (ostensibly 
“white” families find out that they are related to Thomas Jefferson through one of his 
male offspring probably conceived with his slave Sally Hemings). 
 236 Carol Morello, Native American Roots, Once Hidden, Now Embraced, WASHINGTON 
POST, April 7, 2001, at A01. 
 237 Clarence Page, Census Numbers Show Complex Racial Picture, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
March 14, 2001, at 2. 
 238 This unique situation has deep roots in our country.  The social phenomenon 
of “passing” is one manifestation of the inability of many in our society to recognize 
multiracial persons simply by sight.  Passing in this country has historically meant 
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The ambiguity of a multiracial person’s phenotype creates a 
problem of recognition.  At its core, the multiracial Batson problem 
lies in the disparity between persons who can perceive the racial 
makeup of a person and those who cannot.  Because the ability to 
recognize a person who has a multiracial background is not uniform, 
it can lead to unrecognized Batson violations.  For example, when a 
multiracial person is impermissibly dismissed through peremptory 
challenges because of his or her racial make-up it can be more 
difficult to prove the challenger’s motivation.  Given that Batson’s 
protections can easily be overcome by a fabricated reason for 
exclusion, the problem of identifying and rooting out racial 
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges will only grow 
more difficult with the ongoing increase of multiracial citizens.239 
 
that an African-American held himself out as, or was perceived and treated as, white 
by the white community.  For articles on this social phenomenon, see Robert 
Westley, First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited and Demystification As a Critical 
Practice, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297 (2000), and Randall Kennedy, Frank R. Strong 
Law Forum Lecture: Racial Passing, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145 (2001).  The idea that people 
are unable to clearly recognize the racial background of those of a different race is 
supported by studies, which suggest that cross-racial facial identification is less than 
perfect.  See T. Anthony et al., Cross-racial facial identification: A social cognitive 
integration, in 18 PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 296-301 (1992); R. 
Richard Banks, Race-based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and 
Discourse, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1075, 1101-04 (2001); see also HAIZLIP, supra note 234, at 
64 (“During [the turn of the century], many Washingtonians passed for white on a 
part-time basis, mostly for economic and sometimes for social or cultural reasons. . . .  
Usually, their temporary race change was successful.  For a while, however, theaters 
and concert halls hired Negro “spotters” to point out racial imposters.  Many a 
colored socialite of Washington was humiliated in the process.  To their credit, the 
Negro newspapers published the names of spotters so that the community could deal 
with them in its own way, usually by social ostracism.”); see also MARK TWAIN, 
PUDD’NHEAD WILSON (1894) (describing the fictional life of two children, one 
“mixed” passing as “white” and one “white” being mistaken as “black”). 
 239 Anecdotal evidence suggests that this problem is already manifesting itself.  See 
Mark Curriden, One Jury’s Journey, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 17, 2000 (one 
multiracial juror believed she was kept on jury due to her Asian heritage, and paper 
classifies her as Asian-American although her father is Irish and mother is Japanese); 
People v. Barber, 245 Cal. Rptr. 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a lower court’s 
Batson ruling and indicating that the prosecutor claimed to be unaware that one of 
the persons she removed by peremptory challenge was Hispanic); Clarke v. Kmart 
Corp., 559 N.W.2d 337, 383 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (involving a Batson challenge in 
which the trial court recognized one of the dismissed jurors as “biracial”); Green v. 
State, 862 P.2d 1271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (reversing the lower court’s ruling 
despite confusion over whether a juror was black, Hispanic, or white, because the 
defendant and the juror do not need to be of the same cognizable race to succeed in 
a Baston challenge). 
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A.  United States v. White: Biracial/Multiracial Jurors and Batson 
United States v. White240 presents a glimpse of the problems 
multiracial persons pose to the jury selection process in the context 
of peremptory challenges and Batson.  Danny L. White, a young black 
male, was indicted on September 8, 1999, in the Western District of 
Michigan for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 
18 U.S.C.§ 922(g)(1).241  On November 20, 2000, the court began the 
voir dire process.242  After posing various questions to the jury, the 
judge asked the jurors if they could be fair and impartial given that 
the defendant was a black male.243  The judge noted that of all the 
prospective jurors only one appeared to be African-American, Ms. 
Jackson.244  At that point, one of the jurors, Ms. Kirk, stated that she 
wanted the judge to know that she was African-American.245  The 
judge thanked her for her candor, and stated that he would not have 
recognized her as African-American and he believed that not many 
others would have recognized her as being African-American.246 
After questioning the jurors, the prosecutor and defense counsel 
began to use their peremptory challenges to dismiss jurors.  The 
prosecutor dismissed the only visibly black juror and defense counsel 
made a Batson motion.247  In accordance with Batson, the prosecutor 
offered its racial-neutral reasons for dismissing the juror.248  Defense 
counsel then presented rebuttal arguments.  The judge ruled in favor 
of the defendant and granted the Batson motion, and  Ms. Jackson was 
placed back in the venire.249 
The prosecutor raised two issues with the court upon returning 
from the weekend.  First, the prosecutor requested clarification on 
the court’s Batson ruling on Ms. Jackson.250  According to the 
prosecutor, her proffered reasons for dismissing Ms. Jackson were 
race-neutral, satisfying Batson.251  Defense counsel responded to the 
 
 240 No. 1:00-CR-81-01 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 241 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2001). 
 242 Record at 158, United States v. White, No. 1:00-CR-81-01 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id.  Although Ms. Kirk designated herself as African-American, the hue of her 
skin and her features suggest that she is of mixed-descent. 
 246 Id. at 158-59.  Later in the proceedings, the prosecutor indicated that she may 
not have known Ms. Kirk was of African descent.  Id. at 227. 
 247 Id. at 175. 
 248 Record at 177-78, United States v. White, No. 1:00-CR-81-01 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 249 Id. at 178-83. 
 250 Id. at 226-27. 
 251 Id. 
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motions by asserting that the court did reach the issue of pretext and 
found that based on the circumstances, the prosecutor’s reasons for 
dismissing Ms. Jackson were pretextual.252 
The prosecutor then requested that Ms. Kirk be removed for 
cause based on the fact that her brother was prosecuted by one of the 
assistant United States attorneys from her office and had been 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.253  Defense counsel argued 
that the challenge for cause did not appear justified because the 
prosecutor was attempting to use challenges to dismiss the only two 
black jurors on the panel.254 
The court agreed with defense counsel and declined both 
requests by the prosecutor.255  The court stated that, in its opinion, 
the race-neutral reasons for challenging Ms. Jackson were 
pretextual.256  As for the challenge against Ms. Kirk, the court noted 
that the prosecutor knew all of this information about Ms. Kirk prior 
to the weekend and that the only really new piece of information was 
the name of the prosecutor in her brother’s case and this 
information was not  a valid reason to remove Ms. Kirk for cause.257  
The court also stated that this late attempt to remove Ms. Kirk, the 
only other African-American, for cause based on what the court 
considered immaterial information only served to underscore and 
support his earlier Batson ruling on Ms. Jackson.258 
Although this case did not explicitly involve a Batson problem 
with a person who acknowledged themselves as being of mixed-
descent, the circumstances are an indicator of the potential problem 
posed by persons whose racial heritage is not readily ascertainable by 
the attorneys and the judge.  If Ms. Kirk had not disclosed her racial 
makeup and either the prosecutor or the defense attorney, but not 
both, recognized her as being of African descent and successfully 
used a peremptory challenge against her because of her racial 
makeup, a Batson violation could have occurred and gone 
unchallenged by the other party. 
 
 252 Id. at 230-37. 
 253 Id. at 228-37. 
 254 Record at 228-37, United States v. White, No. 1:00-CR-81-01 (W.D. Mich. 2000). 
 255 Id. at 239-44. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 244. 
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B. The Game of “Who is What”259 
As ethnically and racially mixed relationships and marriages 
continue to produce children, the scenario described in White will 
only increase the number or hypothetical racial mixtures that might 
makeup a prospective juror and the concomitant number of racially 
discriminatory reasons one might have for dismissing such a juror 
through the unconstitutional use of a peremptory challenge are 
endless. 
Imagine a criminal trial of a Korean defendant in federal court 
in urban California where the voir dire has commenced with forty-
five persons on the venire.  Based on the 2000 Census and the studies 
of race in this country, the racial makeup of the hypothetical venire is 
fourteen Whites (some of whom may or may not be of mixed 
descent), sixteen Blacks (eleven of whom are most likely of mixed 
descent), seven Asians (several of whom may be of mixed descent), 
five persons of some other ethnic or racial group (all of whom may 
be of mixed racial background), and three self-designated, racially-
mixed persons.260  At least ten persons in this group are Hispanic.261  
This kaleidoscope of racial and ethnic backgrounds makes it possible 
that none to all of the jurors may be of mixed descent and may not 
be readily identifiable in terms of their race or ethnicity to everyone.  
For purposes of this hypothetical, the reader can assume that 
approximately fifteen percent of the venire is not readily identifiable 
as to race or ethnicity: one ostensibly black or white venire person, 
one Asian venire person, one venire person of unidentified 
race/ethnicity, one venire person claiming Hispanic descent, and the 
three venire persons of self-designated multiracial descent (one 
person of black and white descent, one person of Asian and white 
descent, and one person who is black, Asian, and Hispanic). 
The questioning of the panel is complete and the attorneys 
begin the use of their peremptory challenges.  The prosecutor 
believes one of the six mixed jurors is of Korean descent, will identify 
 
 259 The imaginary scenario described in this hypothetical is just that, imaginary.  
None of the assumptions about the motives of the hypothetical Assistant United 
States Attorney or Defense Counsel are meant to imply a predilection for such 
actions or beliefs by either group or institution.  While all of the racial and ethnic 
stereotyping described in this Part are both offensive and based on inaccurate 
generalizations about individuals’ beliefs based upon the color of their skin, such 
stereotyping is a part of the human condition in this country. 
 260 These hypothetical figures are based on the 2000 Census taken in Oakland, 
California.  See http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06001.html (last visited 
September 25, 2002). 
 261 Id. 
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or have a biased sympathy towards the defendant, and uses a 
peremptory challenge to remove him.  Or, equally likely, Defense 
Counsel thinks that this same person is of Japanese descent and 
removes the juror with a peremptory challenge based on the belief 
that the historical animosity between Koreans and Japanese resulting 
from World War II atrocities will harm his client.  For a Batson 
violation to occur under these circumstances, one of the two parties 
must be unaware of the mixed-descent of the removed juror. 
Defense Counsel is ready to use a second peremptory challenge.  
Council believes that one of the multiracial persons on the venire is 
of African descent.  Given the perceived animosity that has developed 
between Blacks and Koreans in the aftermath of the Rodney King 
verdict and subsequent Los Angeles riots, Defense Counsel uses a 
peremptory challenge to remove this juror.  The prosecutor believes 
that one of the multiracial jurors is of Vietnamese descent and based 
on his belief that such individuals are suspicious of the police or any 
authority figure because of certain cultural biases, he removes this 
juror with his second peremptory challenge. 
The end result of this hypothetical is that each side could 
potentially remove several or all of the multiracial jurors through the 
use of peremptory challenges and be in violation of Baston, yet such 
unconstitutional actions remain unknown to the other side.  Even 
more frustrating is the scenario in which a juror is removed by one 
side based on the belief that the juror is of a certain racial 
background and the juror is in fact not of that racial/ethnic 
background.  Has a Batson violation occurred based on the 
unconstitutional motive of the attorney or must the removed person’s 
race actually be the race/ethnicity that the attorney thought he/she 
was for a Batson violation to occur? 
With the increasing population of mixed persons in this country, 
the hypothetical described above may have already occurred in any 
number of urban courts in this country.  Based on the 2000 Census 
and the evidence that suggests the racially discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges has not disappeared, the frequency of this 
sort of problem will expand and Batson, as it presently stands, is 
simply unequipped to deal with it.  This plausible situation leads to 
inexonerable conclusion that in twenty-first century America, Batson 
(and its  “guess whose coming to dinner” framework) is simply a relic, 
unable to ensure that discrimination based on race in the use of 
peremptory challenges does not take place. 
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IV.  TWO REMEDIES262 
Given the collision of Batson with the increase in the population 
of multiracial persons, there are two remedies that can be used to 
combat the problem of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory 
challenges to strike jurors of multiracial backgrounds: (1) abolish 
peremptory challenges, or (2) question the jurors about their racial 
heritage during voir dire. 
A.  Abolishing Peremptory Challenges 
Critics of the peremptory challenge have argued that the ideal of 
the peremptory challenge is inconsistent with the desire to have the 
composition of juries represent the whole of society.263  Peremptory 
challenges reflect an improper distrust of jurors, cause an improper 
shift of focus from the individual to the group, and inject unnecessary 
hostility into the jury selection process.264  Others have argued that 
the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits the use of any peremptories to 
remove black jurors if the defendant is black..265  The best argument 
may simply be that of Justice Marshall in his concurrence in Batson: 
Any prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for 
striking a juror, and trial courts are ill equipped to second-guess 
those reasons. How is the court to treat a prosecutor’s statement 
that he struck a juror because the juror had a son about the same 
age as defendant, or seemed “uncommunicative,” or “never 
cracked a smile” and, therefore “did not possess the sensitivities 
necessary to realistically look at the issues and decide the facts in 
this case”? If such easily generated explanations are sufficient to 
discharge the prosecutor’s obligation to justify his strikes on 
nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court 
today may be illusory. . . .  [O]nly by banning peremptories 
entirely can such [racial] discrimination be ended.266 
The rationale behind the genesis of the peremptory challenge in 
England in the thirteenth century has lost its validity in the twentieth 
and twenty-first century making the peremptory challenge an 
 
 262 Changing procedural aspects of our justice system, especially our criminal 
justice system, based upon considerations of racial injustice is not without 
considerable precedent.  See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal 
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000). 
 263 See, e.g., Stephen BATES, CANTIGNY CONFERENCE SERIES SPECIAL REPORT, THE 
AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 24 (2000); ABRAMSON, supra note 14, at 131-39. 
 264 Hoffman, supra note 127, at 851–71. 
 265 Douglas L. Cobert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as Prohibition 
Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990). 
 266 Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 105-06, 108 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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anachronism.267  Indeed, the argument that the peremptory 
challenge is necessary as a means for ensuring an impartial jury is not 
supported by the rationale for its creation in thirteenth century 
England;268  Moreover, it is used in the context of present-day 
litigation to empanel a jury partial to one’s side, not for its ostensible 
goal of empaneling an impartial jury.269  The rise of the peremptory 
challenge to such a venerable position in the American justice system 
may be due to the very reason it should no longer be allowed: its use 
as a means of removing potential black jurors in the post-
Reconstruction, Jim Crow south.270 
The judicial recognition that the peremptory challenge, despite 
Batson, is in direct conflict with this country’s desire to eradicate 
racial discrimination and possibly even the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause seems to support the calls by critics for the 
institution’s abolition.271  In addition, many of those same judges have 
recognized that the make-up of our society is changing in such a 
fashion as to make Batson simply untenable because courts will be 
forced to “play a diverting ethnological parlor game called ‘Who is 
What and How Do We Know It?’”272 
Yet the Supreme Court and various attorneys and legal groups 
still cling to the notion that the peremptory challenge is an essential 
part of our justice system.  Because the United States Supreme Court 
does not appear receptive to abolishing the peremptory challenge,273 
the next best solution is to find out the racial makeup of the venire 
persons prior to the use of peremptory challenges by either side. 
B.  Questioning the Venire 
With the Court firmly against abolishing the peremptory 
 
 267 See Wamget v. Texas, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 64, at *27-*31 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Sept. 12, 2001) (Meyers, J., concurring); Hoffman, supra note 127, at 819-22. 
 268 See Wamget, 2001 Tex Crim. App. LEXIS 64, at *27-*33. 
 269 Id; see also Albert Schuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory 
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 203 (1989). 
 270 See Hoffman, supra note 127, at 827-28. 
 271 See Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Alen 
v. State, 596 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (Hubbart, J., concurring); 
Chew v. State, 527 A.2d 332, 350 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987); People v. Hernandez, 75 
552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990) (Titone, J., concurring), aff’d., 500 U.S. 352 (1991); 
Wamget, 2001 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 64, at *22-*43; see also Hoffman, supra note 127; 
People v. Brown, 97 N.Y.2d 500, 509 (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (suggesting elimination 
or curtailment of peremptory challenges). 
 272 Mejia v. State, 599 A.2d 1207, 1208 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), vacated, 616 A.2d 356 
(1992). 
 273 See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995). 
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challenge, the only way to prevent multiracial persons from being 
removed from the venire based on race is to have them disclose their 
racial makeup to the parties and the judge. 
Questioning potential jurors about race is not without 
foundation.  Federal law requires that juror qualification forms have 
a question regarding the potential juror’s race with a statement “that 
information concerning race is required solely to enforce 
nondiscrimination in jury selection and has no bearing on an 
individual’s qualification for jury service.”274  Federal courts have also 
interpreted the Jury Selection and Service Act as allowing the 
defendant in a criminal case an unqualified right to inspect the jury 
list, 275 but not necessarily the individual questionnaires, 276 and not to 
help in the voir dire process.277  As such, challenges are generally to 
determine whether there is systemic discrimination in obtaining a fair 
cross-section of the community for the venire under the Sixth 
Amendment.  The timing of the challenges does not allow an 
attorney to get information about an individual juror’s race during 
the critical timeframe: the voir dire process. 
Given that federal courts have jurors fill out a questionnaire 
asking about race, it does not seem inappropriate to have the jurors 
disclose this information again during the voir dire process in order 
to accomplish the same goal as the questionnaire: to enforce 
nondiscrimination in the jury selection process.  While the questions 
posed in the questionnaire are required under the statute and are an 
attempt to comply with the Sixth Amendment’s impartial jury 
requirement, the same rationale exists under the Fourteenth 
Amendment for purposes of peremptory challenges and the 
enforcement of nondiscrimination in the jury selection process. 
This disclosure of a venire person’s racial makeup could take 
one of two forms: either orally to a question posed by the judge or 
the attorneys, or a written answer that would be provided to the judge 
and the attorneys.278  Both methods will provide the judge and the 
parties with the information necessary to assist each in determining 
 
 274 28 U.S.C.S. § 1869(h) (2001); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-232(2002); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 756.04 (2002). 
 275 United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019, 1025 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 276 United States v. Schnieder, 111 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Davenport, 824 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098 
(6th Cir. 1984). 
 277 Jewel v. Artic Enterprise, Inc., 801 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1986). 
 278 One critic has called for an entire voir dire to be conducted by written 
questionnaires. See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir 
Dire by Questionnaire and the “Blind” Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 285 (1999). 
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when a potential Batson violation has taken place. 
While both methods may provide the same result for purposes of 
Batson, a written question is supported by precedent and may provide 
more privacy to the individual being questioned.279  For example in 
the O.J. Simpson trial, the seventy-five page long questionnaire given 
to potential jurors included a question about the person’s race.280  
The answers were shared with the judge and attorneys, yet were not 
disclosed to the public, thereby conferring some level of privacy.  In 
most cases, extensive questionnaires are not necessary and the written 
questions posed to the venirepersons could be confined to those 
normally asked in addition to one about the potential juror’s race.281  
Federal law requires federal courts to question potential 
venirepersons about their race through a written questionnaire, but 
states are not required to follow the federal process.  While some 
states question potential venireperson about this information,282 many 
do not. 283  The lack of uniformity among the states on this issue, 
despite the uniform rule required by the Sixth Amendment, implies 
that there are probably disparities in the way state courts address the 
issue.  This disparity may translate into Batson violations.  Given that 
states already apply Batson in an unequal fashion, the ability of state 
courts to deal individually with the problem of multiracial persons is 
questionable.  A uniform requirement that venirepersons be 
questioned about race, either in written or oral form, would 
guarantee that, at a minimum, the information is available for 
inspection by the parties, the trial court, and any subsequent 
 
 279 See Baker, supra note 121, at §2.8. 
 280 See DONNER & GABRIAL, supra note 194, at § 16-15.  The questionnaire also 
included questions about interracial relationships and the person’s feelings and 
attitudes regarding such relationships.  Id. at § 16-37.  These questions may have 
been posed because one of the victims, Nicole Brown Simpson, former wife of the 
defendant, was white and the defendant is black, and there are still hostile attitudes 
towards such relationships in both the white and black communities.  See Olson, 
supra note 231, at 80; see also WAITING TO EXHALE (20th Century Fox 1992); JUNGLE 
FEVER (Universal Pictures 1991). 
 281 See Juror Questionnaire, United States District Court, Western District of 
Michigan (on file with author). 
 282 See, e.g., Summons For Jury Service, Superior Court of Delaware.  Courts do 
recommend that judges ask if the race of the parties, the attorneys, or the witnesses 
will affect a juror’s judgment.  See http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/2001 (last 
visited September 25, 2002).  But this is not the same as asking a juror his or her 
racial makeup. 
 283 See, e.g., Juror Questionnaire, Colorado; Juror Questionnaire, Alaska; Kings 
County, NY, Juror Qualification Questionnaire; Juror Questionnaire, New York (on 
file with author).  California has no set juror questionnaire and does not mandate a 
question regarding race.  See email from Cajuror@jud.ca.gov to John Rosenthal 
(March 18, 2001) (on file with author). 
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appellate court. 
CONCLUSION 
The racial makeup of America is changing and multiracial 
persons will continue to increase proportionately in our population.  
Since the racial heritage of such persons may not be readily apparent, 
the disparity in the ability of individuals to ascertain a person’s racial 
background has grave implications, specifically regarding a court’s 
ability to apply Batson effectively.  Two solutions to this problem are 
available: abolish the peremptory challenge or question jurors about 
their racial makeup during voir dire.  Either solution will provide the 
parties and the courts with the ability to better discern racial 
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges and will reinforce 
the constitutional dictates of Batson and the Fourteenth Amendment.  
To do nothing is to leave the rights of those of multiracial descent to 
sit on a jury and participate in our system of justice to the whim and 
will of would-be discriminators and to emasculate Batson for coming 
generations of multiracial person. 
